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Representation for Removal? The Cherokee’s Claim to a 
Congressional Delegate Assessed Under the Canons of Construction* 
The Treaty of New Echota is the pact between the Cherokee Nation and the 
United States which served as the legal basis for Cherokee removal via the 
infamous Trail of Tears. The Treaty of New Echota contains several promises 
made by the United States in exchange for the Cherokee ancestral land in North 
Carolina and several other southern states. One of these promises, found in 
Article 7, states that the Cherokee “shall be entitled to a delegate in the House 
of Representatives of the United States whenever Congress shall make provision 
for the same.” Article 7 has been the recent subject of controversy due to its 
textual ambiguity and historical implications of possible Native American 
representation at the federal level. These potential ramifications, coupled with 
the mounting pressure from the Cherokee Nation claiming that Article 7 grants 
the Tribe an affirmative right to a delegate, warrants an investigation into 
Article 7’s effect. 
From its robust body of precedent on Native American treaty interpretation, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has developed a set of rules called the Indian law canons 
of construction which federal courts apply when the effect of a treaty involving 
Native Americans is at issue. This Recent Development sets out to shed light on 
the implications of Article 7’s delegate promise by applying the canons to its text 
to ultimately determine whether the United States is legally bound to grant the 
Cherokee Nation’s request for a delegate in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
just as a federal court would do if this issue came before the judiciary.  
INTRODUCTION** 
On August 22, 2019, speaking to a crowd of people in front of the 
Cherokee National History Museum in Tahlequah, Oklahoma, Chuck Hoskin 
 
 *  © 2020 Patrick A. Wolf. 
 **  Currently, there is an ongoing discussion surrounding what terminology is correct and most 
respectful to the preferences of individuals of Native American descent regarding how such individuals 
prefer to be referenced, and there is no simple answer to this question. Frequently Asked Questions, 
SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM AM. INDIAN, https://americanindian.si.edu/nk360/faq/did-you-
know [https://perma.cc/TU8K-4XCT]; see also Amanda Blackhorse, Blackhorse: Do You Prefer 
‘Native American’ or ‘American Indian’?, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (May 22, 2015), 
https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/blackhorse-do-you-prefer-native-american-or-american-
indian-kHWRPJqIGU6X3FTVdMi9EQ [https://perma.cc/CAD5-UJTH]. In this Recent 
Development, I have decided to use the term “Native American” when referencing individuals 
of Native American descent because, while some tribes of Native American descent disfavor this 
term, “Native American” remains widely accepted and used. Blackhorse, supra; Frequently 
Asked Questions, supra. Although many individuals of Native American descent refer to themselves as 
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Jr., the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation (“Principal Chief Hoskin”), 
announced that he planned to place a Cherokee Nation (“Cherokee”) delegate 
in the U.S House of Representatives as part of his “First 100 Days in Office” 
initiative.1 If Principal Chief Hoskin’s initiative comes to fruition, it would be 
a monumental moment for the Cherokee. Though the delegate would likely be 
nonvoting,2 this would still give the Cherokee an opportunity to voice their 
opinions in a meaningful way—something that has been sorely lacking since the 
eighteenth century. 3  Principal Chief Hoskin subsequently nominated Kim 
 
“Indian,” the term “Native American” better encompasses the preferences of indigenous people as 
a whole. However, much of the U.S. legal system’s jurisprudence uses the term “Indian.” 
Therefore, this Recent Development will use the term “Native American” throughout to reference 
indigenous people and will use “Indian” only when citing legal doctrines or directly quoting language 
from sources. 
 1. Lindsey Bark, Teehee Nominated as Cherokee Nation’s Delegate to Congress, CHEROKEE 
PHOENIX (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/index/103477 [https://perma.cc/ 
BNV8-QVSR]; see also Cherokee Nation Announces Appointment of Teehee as Delegate to Congress, 
CLAREMORE DAILY PROGRESS (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.claremoreprogress.com/news/cherokee-
nation-announces-appointment-of-teehee-as-delegate-to-congress/article_9ae2a6f0-c52b-11e9-8797-
2f3a2ee6b3ba.html [https://perma.cc/8FNU-CFVZ]. While it has recently been set in motion, 
Principal Chief Hoskin’s plan to place a delegate in the U.S. House of Representatives is not exactly 
new; several Cherokee tribal members have had this goal in mind for decades now. In fact, Principal 
Chief Hoskin ensured that a delegate provision was included in the 1999 Cherokee Constitution so the 
Cherokee would unanimously support the plan. Chuck Hoskin Jr., Cherokee Nation’s Historic Delegate to 
Congress, TAHLEQUAH DAILY PRESS (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.tahlequahdailypress.com/news/ 
cherokee-nation-s-historic-delegate-to-congress/article_69ebc83b-f5fb-5f88-be5f-b6fddc1e02fc.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZN6E-ZD7Y?type=image] (“As a young man, I was a delegate at the 1999 Cherokee 
Constitutional Convention and made sure a delegate provision was included in our Constitution . . . .”). 
 2. See Ezra Rosser, The Nature of Representation: The Cherokee Right to a Congressional Delegate, 15 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 127–31 (2005) (discussing how the Cherokee delegate would be similar to the 
nonvoting representatives of American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands). The delegate, if arranged like the delegates of American Samoa, the District of 
Columbia, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, would be 
able to introduce legislation and voice opinions but not vote outside of individual committees. See 
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., DELEGATES TO THE U.S. CONGRESS: HISTORY 
AND CURRENT STATUS 1, 6 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40555.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK9D-
DUJL]. 
 3. See Jack Blair, Demanding a Voice in Our Own Best Interest: A Call for a Delegate of the Cherokee 
Nation to the United States House of Representatives, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 225, 225–33 (1995). The 
Cherokee have been severely underrepresented and oppressed by the U.S. government in the past. For 
an account of the federally-authorized Cherokee removal from ancestral lands via the Trial of Tears, 
enslavement of tribal members, and government-sanctioned wars against the Cherokee, see generally 
THEDA PERDUE & MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE CHEROKEE REMOVAL: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH 
DOCUMENTS (1995). Additionally, the Cherokee have only ever had seven of its tribal members 
participate in the federal legislature. There has been one U.S. senator—Robert Latham Owen. JERRY 
D. STUBBEN, NATIVE AMERICANS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 
171 (2006). There have been six U.S. House representatives—William Wirt Hastings; Will Rogers, 
Jr.; Clem McSpadden; Richard H. Cain; Brad Carson; and Markwayne Mullin. Id.; Carson, Brad, 
OKLA. HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=CA062 [https:// 
perma.cc/Q4AB-KKEC]; Mullin, Markwayne, OKLA. HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.okhistory.org/ 
publications/enc/entry.php?entry=MU026 [https://perma.cc/57RV-E9VH]; Cain, Richard 
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Teehee4 as his choice for the congressional delegate, and Teehee’s nomination 
was approved by the Council of the Cherokee Nation at a special meeting on 
August 29, 2019.5 
Therefore, Principal Chief Hoskin has a plan, he has his choice of delegate, 
and he has the approval of the Cherokee—but does he have a legal basis for this 
strategy? Principal Chief Hoskin certainly thinks so and references the Treaty 
of New Echota6 as support for this perceived right.7 The Treaty of New Echota 
is a pact between the United States and the Cherokee, which served as the legal 
basis for the Cherokee’s removal westward, known as the Trail of Tears.8 As 
part of the Treaty of New Echota, the United States made several promises in 
exchange for Cherokee lands in the Southeast.9 Article 7 of the Treaty of New 
Echota (“Article 7” or “delegate clause”), which Chief Hoskin specifically 
referenced,10 provides that the Cherokee “shall be entitled to a delegate in the 
House of Representatives of the United States whenever Congress shall make 
provision for the same.”11 Thus, the question becomes, does this 185-year-old 
treaty provision require the modern Congress to honor the Cherokee’s request 
for a delegate in the U.S. House of Representatives? 
Answering this question requires interpreting Article 7. Over the course 
of more than two centuries of ruling on Native American tribal issues, the 
 
Harvey,  U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/10470 
[https://perma.cc/GU5Y-3X5A]. 
 4. Bark, supra note 1. Kim Teehee was President Obama’s advisor on Native American relations, 
the director of the bipartisan Congressional Native American Caucus, and is currently the Cherokee’s 
vice president of government relations. Id. In February 2020, she was selected by TIME Magazine 
as one of sixteen activists fighting for equality in the United States because of her nomination 
to this historic position. These 16 People and Groups Are Fighting for a More Equal America, 
TIME  (Feb. 20, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://time.com/5783951/equality-activists/?fbclid=IwAR2oP-
NJeV5sNc8LPrvsIm_6hRL9kn5IVrmNGM0aQDePUZN4ruBxKgNvatM [https://perma.cc/HLA6-
6YJA]. 
 5. P.R. Lockhart, The Cherokee Nation Says It Has a Right to a Congressional Delegate. Now It Wants 
Congress To Fulfill Its Promise, VOX (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/9/ 
4/20849711/cherokee-nation-congress-kimberly-teehee-native-americans [https://perma.cc/DFD8-
6BBD]. 
 6. Treaty with the Cherokees, Cherokee-U.S., Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478, 478–88 [hereinafter 
Treaty of New Echota], reprinted in 2 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, SENATE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFS., 
INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 439–49 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904).  
 7. Chuck Hoskin Jr., Opinion, The 184-Year-OId Promise to the Cherokee Congress Must Keep, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/opinion/cherokee-house-of-
representatives.html [https://perma.cc/5WY7-R364]. 
 8. PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 3, at 20–21. For general information on the historical removal 
of the Cherokee from their ancestral lands in the eastern United States to the western United States, 
see generally JOHN EHLE, TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION (1st 
ed. 1988). 
 9. See Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 478–86, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 
439–47. 
 10. See Hoskin, supra note 1. 
 11. Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 482, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 442–43. 
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Supreme Court has developed a body of law called the “Indian law canons of 
construction” (“canons of construction” or “canons”).12 The Court uses these 
canons to interpret Native American treaty provisions, and thereby determine 
their legal force. 13  The canons of construction dictate that any ambiguous 
provisions in Native American treaties must be liberally construed in the Native 
Americans’ favor and interpreted as the Native Americans who signed the treaty 
would have understood the provisions, unless clearly-countering congressional 
intent exists.14 This Recent Development examines the delegate clause under 
these canons of construction to determine the likely legal status of the 
Cherokee’s claim to congressional representation. Ultimately, it concludes that 
the Treaty of New Echota gives the Cherokee the affirmative right to a 
delegate. 15  Part I of this Recent Development describes the history of the 
Treaty of New Echota. Part II describes the Treaty of New Echota’s terms. Part 
III briefly explains why the Treaty of New Echota is modernly enforceable. 
Part IV details the canons of construction, applies them to the delegate clause, 
and argues that interpretation under the canons guarantees the Cherokee an 
unconditional right to a delegate in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
I.  HISTORY OF THE TREATY OF NEW ECHOTA 
The 1835 Treaty of New Echota—often called the “Cherokee Removal 
Treaty”—is a pact between the United States and the Cherokee, under which 
the Cherokee ceded their ancestral lands to the United States in exchange for 
money, western lands, and protection.16 While the history of the Treaty of New 
Echota is not central to the legal argument herein, it is important to understand 
the context in which this document was drafted in order to discern both how 
the Native Americans who signed the Treaty of New Echota understood the 
document and why some of its provisions are ambiguous—two subjects that are 
crucial to the canons’ application in Part IV. 
The Treaty of New Echota is the product of a southern state’s 
stubbornness.17 In 1828, the Georgia legislature passed laws that stripped the 
 
 12. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221–25 (Rennard Strickland, 
Charles F. Wilkinson, Reid P. Chambers, Richard B. Collins, Carole E. Goldberg, Robert N. Clinton, 
David H. Getches, Ralph W. Johnson & Monroe E. Price eds., 1982 ed.) (discussing the Indian law 
canons of construction). 
 13. See id. at 221. 
 14. See id. at 221–23. 
 15. To read discussions of the Cherokee’s right to a delegate beyond a strictly legal analysis, see 
generally Blair, supra note 3 (explaining the legal history of the right to a delegate as well as 
congressional delegates in general and the implications of establishing a Cherokee delegate); Rosser, 
supra note 2 (describing the historical context of the Treaty of Echota as well as arguments for and 
against the Cherokee right to a delegate). 
 16. Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 478–79, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 439–
40. 
 17. See Rosser, supra note 2, at 96 n.4. 
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Cherokee of all their Georgian lands, including the land that the United States 
had expressly recognized in the Treaty of Hopewell18 as Cherokee property.19 
Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down these laws as 
unconstitutional in Worcester v. Georgia,20 stating that regulation of the Native 
American lands in Georgia was under the jurisdiction of the federal 
government, not the state. 21  In an act of unprecedented defiance, Georgia 
blatantly ignored the Supreme Court’s decision and continued to enforce its 
legislation.22 
Recognizing this tension between the state and federal governments as an 
opportunity to effect the change he desired, President Andrew Jackson—a 
notoriously staunch supporter of Native American removal—met with John 
Ridge, an influential Cherokee tribal member, and convinced Ridge to endorse 
removal via treaty. 23  However, many Cherokee did not support removal 
negotiations, including the Principal Chief of the Cherokee, John Ross 
(“Principal Chief Ross”). 24  Principal Chief Ross and the majority of the 
Cherokee despised the idea of acquiescing to the removal demands of the 
United States.25 
 
 18. See Treaty with the Cherokee, Cherokee-U.S., Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, 19 [hereinafter Treaty 
of Hopewell], reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 8–11. The Treaty of Hopewell was the original 
treaty with the Cherokee and granted federal recognition of the Cherokee’s southeastern lands in 
Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Id., reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 
9. 
 19. PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 3, at 61–62. These laws were passed partly due to the pressure 
exerted by the Georgia Gold Rush, which vastly increased the potential price of Cherokee land and the 
determination of white Georgians to see the Cherokee removed from gold-rich soil. See generally DAVID 
WILLIAMS, THE GEORGIA GOLD RUSH: TWENTY-NINERS, CHEROKEES, AND GOLD FEVER (1993) 
(describing the Georgia gold rush and its effect on the Cherokee). 
 20. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). This is the opinion which prompted one of the most 
interesting constitutional struggles between the executive and judicial branches in U.S. history. 
In response to the holding in Worcester, President Andrew Jackson is infamously rumored to have 
stated, “John Marshall has made his decision; let him enforce it now if he can.” See THURMAN 
WILKINS, CHEROKEE TRAGEDY: THE RIDGE FAMILY AND THE DECIMATION OF A PEOPLE 236 
(2d ed. 1986). 
 21. Id. at 561–63. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion explained how Native American affairs 
cannot be controlled by an individual state, as the relationship with Native Americans is one based 
on international treaties and deals with issues of sovereignty. See id. at 561–63. Perhaps 
most interestingly, Chief Justice Marshall also noted that the federal government’s right to deal with 
Native Americans did not include a right to possession of their lands or a say in their laws. Id. 
This ruling became one of the bases for tribal sovereignty law. See PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 3, at 
69. 
 22. See WILKINS, supra note 20, at 236. 
 23. See id. at 236–37. 
 24. See PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 3, at 144–45; Rosser, supra note 2, at 94–95. 
 25. See PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 3, at 144–45 (discussing Ross’s efforts to abrogate the 
Treaty of New Echota after it was made, which are indicative of his overall feelings toward a pact for 
removal and the Cherokee support of his position); Rosser, supra note 2, at 94–95. 
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Regardless of the majority’s disapproval, Ridge organized a party of 
twenty influential Cherokee men—known as the Treaty Party—and secretly 
met with President Jackson’s appointed envoy for treaty removal, John 
Schermerhorn, at the Cherokee capital of New Echota.26 Without the presence 
and knowledge of Principal Chief Ross or a majority of the Cherokee National 
Council, 27  the Treaty Party and Schermerhorn penned the Treaty of New 
Echota on December 29, 1835, and President Jackson’s representatives signed 
it on March 1, 1836.28 Despite protest from the Cherokee, Congress ratified the 
Treaty of New Echota by one vote in May of 1836.29 Principal Chief Ross pled 
with Congress to nullify the Treaty of New Echota because he believed it was 
not negotiated by the true legal representative of the Cherokee.30 Principal 
Chief Ross even sent Congress petitions against the Treaty of New Echota, 
signed by 15,000 Cherokee in total,31 which was almost the entire Cherokee 
Tribe at that time. 32  Principal Chief Ross’s efforts were ignored, and the 
forcible removal process—the Trail of Tears—began in 1838.33 
II.  TERMS OF THE TREATY OF NEW ECHOTA 
The core agreement of the Treaty of New Echota is that the Cherokee 
would relinquish their ancestral lands in the southeastern United States to the 
federal government in return for money and land in Oklahoma.34 The specific 
terms of this exchange are found in Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of New 
Echota.35 
 
 26. See STANLEY W. HOIG, THE CHEROKEES AND THEIR CHIEFS 152–54 (1998).  
 27. See id.; Rosser, supra note 2, at 116–17. 
 28. Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 478, 486, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 439, 
447. 
 29. Rosser, supra note 2, at 107. 
 30. See HOIG, supra note 26, at 155; Rosser, supra note 2, at 116–17. This situation raises 
questions of validity on the Treaty of New Echota’s formation. Was the Treaty of New Echota signed 
by true legal representatives of the Cherokee that had the power to create a binding treaty or was it 
simply signed by a rogue group of Cherokee? Was Congress right to ratify the Treaty of New Echota, 
even when it knew that Principal Chief Ross had not signed it? And was Congress justified in enforcing 
the Treaty of New Echota after Principal Chief Ross conclusively demonstrated that nearly the entirety 
of the Cherokee did not agree to or support the Treaty of New Echota? These questions are all 
interesting and important but outside the narrow scope of this Recent Development. For historical 
information on the possible illegitimacy of the Treaty of New Echota, see generally Carl J. Vipperman, 
The Bungled Treaty of New Echota: The Failure of Cherokee Removal, 1836–1838, 73 GA. HIST. Q. 540 
(1989). 
 31. PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 3, at 145; HOIG, supra note 26, at 155. 
 32. Rosser, supra note 2, at 130. 
 33. See generally JOHN P. BOWES, THE TRAIL OF TEARS: REMOVAL IN THE SOUTH (2007) 
(describing the forced removal of the Cherokee). 
 34. Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 478–81, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 439–
42. 
 35. Id. at 479–80, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 440–41. 
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Article 1 states that the Cherokee agree to convey “all their lands and 
possessions east of the Mississippi river” to the United States.36 This Cherokee 
ancestral land contained large parts of Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Georgia, and Alabama, 37  comprising 
most of the southern section of the Appalachian Mountains and its Piedmont 
region.38 The remainder of Article 1 states that the Cherokee would receive a 
sum of $5,000,000 in consideration for these lands.39 
Article 2 describes in detail the Oklahoma land given to the Cherokee, in 
addition to $5,000,000, in exchange for the Cherokee’s relinquishment of land 
in Article 1.40 The Oklahoma tract totaled 7,000,000 acres, but was subject to a 
proviso allowing the United States to grant easements permitting other Native 
Americans to gather salt on the land.41 Article 2 also contains two interesting 
provisions relating to additional land grants: (1) a guaranty of “free and 
unmolested” use of all U.S. land west of the Oklahoma reservation lands (which 
would include the entire western United States); and (2) an option for an 
additional estimated 800,000 acres of land at the price of $500,000.42 
Aside from Articles 1 and 2, the most important article of the Treaty of 
New Echota, for purposes of this Recent Development, is Article 7,43 which has 
become known as the delegate clause. Unlike Articles 1 and 2, which address 
immediate cession and compensation, Article 7 provides subsequent 
compensation to the Cherokee in the form of future representation in the 
federal legislative branch.44 The entirety of the delegate clause reads: 
The Cherokee nation having already made great progress in civilization 
and deeming it important that every proper and laudable inducement 
should be offered to their people to improve their condition as well as to 
guard and secure in the most effectual manner the rights guarantied [sic] 
to them in this treaty, and with a view to illustrate the liberal and 
enlarged policy of the Government of the United States towards the 
 
 36. Id. at 479, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 441. 
 37. See GREGORY D. SMITHERS, THE CHEROKEE DIASPORA 5 (2015). 
 38. See id.  
 39. Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 479, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 440. 
Adjusting for modern inflation, this amount comes to $106,600,000. Ian Webster, Value of $5,000,000 
from 1871 to 2020, CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/ 
1871?amount=5000000 [https://perma.cc/K8PN-HE6J]. 
 40. Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 479–80, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 440–
41. 
 41. Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 480, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 441. 
 42. Id. While neither of these provisions are central to the argument of this Recent Development, 
both are rather interesting in their own right. These clauses seem to potentially grant the Cherokee a 
right to a great deal of additional land in the western United States (perhaps even as far as the Pacific 
coast), yet to the extent of my knowledge and research, the United States has not addressed either 
provision.  
 43. Id. at 482, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 442–43. 
 44. Id. 
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Indians in their removal beyond the territorial limits of the States, it is 
stipulated that they shall be entitled to a delegate in the House of 
Representatives of the United States whenever Congress shall make 
provision for the same.45 
The critical part of the delegate clause states that the Cherokee “shall be entitled 
to a delegate in the House of Representatives of the United States whenever 
Congress shall make provision for the same.”46 The remainder of this Recent 
Development seeks to determine whether this language guarantees the 
Cherokee a right to a delegate. 
Articles 3 through 5 and Article 8 contain provisions that are important to 
this Recent Development’s analysis of the delegate clause and are detailed in 
Section IV.B. Article 6 and Articles 9 through 19, while interesting and 
impactful in their own rights, are not crucial to this Recent Development’s 
discussion and, therefore, will not be addressed. 
III.  IS THE TREATY OF NEW ECHOTA MODERNLY ENFORCEABLE? 
For the Cherokee to successfully claim a delegate in the U.S. House of 
Representatives under the authority of Article 7, the Treaty of New Echota and 
its terms must have current and binding legal effect on the United States. To 
establish the magnitude of this contemporary effect, we must determine (1) 
whether ancient treaties between Native Americans and the United States are 
considered valid in general, and (2) whether the Treaty of New Echota itself 
was valid when drafted in 1835. 47  The sections below address these issues 
respectively. 
A. Are Native American Treaties Valid in General? 
The threshold question is whether the United States today generally 
recognizes its treaties with Native American tribal governments as valid. Both 
the legislative and judicial branches have responded affirmatively. 
 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. An additional question that could be asked is whether the Treaty of New Echota has been 
terminated by superseding state or federal law or by other grants. However, to my knowledge, no 
research or case law has suggested that the Treaty of New Echota has been terminated under the 
modern termination test articulated in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 
202–03 (1999), and a deep analysis of this question is beyond the limited scope of this Recent 
Development. 
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The Senate has been ratifying treaties with sovereign Native American 
nations pursuant to its constitutional duty 48  since the 1700s. 49  In fact, the 
Senate ratified as many as fifty-nine treaties between the United States and 
Native American tribes in the 1860s alone.50 Though the Indian Appropriations 
Act of 1871 51 forbids future treaties between the United States and Native 
Americans,52 it also guarantees that “no obligation of any treaty lawfully made 
and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall 
be hereby invalidated or impaired.”53 Thus, while treaty making with Native 
Americans is now formally prohibited, Congress has ensured that such treaties 
existing before 1871 still carry full legal authority.54 
The judicial branch has also consistently upheld treaties between the 
United States and Native American tribes as valid and legally binding. For 
centuries, the Supreme Court has ruled on legal issues arising from treaties with 
Native American tribes, recognizing the treaties’ validity. 55  In Worcester, a 
landmark opinion that became the foundation for Native American tribal 
sovereignty jurisprudence, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged the Native 
Americans’ ability to make treaties with the United States by stating that “[t]he 
constitution . . . has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the 
Indian nations, and, consequently, admits their rank among those powers who 
 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power . . . to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”). 
 49. The first treaty between the United States and a Native American tribe was ratified in 1778. 
Treaty with the Delawares, Delaware-U.S., Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 
6, at 3. 
 50. Mark G. Hirsch, 1871: The End of Indian-Treaty Making, AM. INDIAN MAG. (2014), 
https://www.americanindianmagazine.org/story/1871-end-indian-treaty-making [https://perma.cc/ 
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 51. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, Pub. L. No. 41-120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 71).  
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 55. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999); 
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 384–86, 421–24 (1980); Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 541, 561–63 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 59–61, 74–75 (1831) 
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are capable of making treaties.” 56  In United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of 
Whisky,57 the Court recognized that “[f]rom the commencement of its existence, 
the United States has negotiated with the Indians in their tribal condition as 
nations, dependent, it is true, but still capable of making treaties.”58 
B. Was the Treaty of New Echota Valid when It Was Drafted in 1835? 
The Treaty of New Echota satisfies all of the constitutional requirements 
for a treaty to be legitimate. Under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution, a valid treaty must be drafted by the President and ratified by 
two-thirds of the Senate. The Treaty of New Echota was executed by President 
Andrew Jackson’s representatives, signed by his hand, and ratified by the Senate 
(albeit by one vote).59 Thus, there is no issue with the Treaty of New Echota 
potentially failing to meet the constitutional prerequisites for its validity. 
Additionally, the judicial branch has recognized the legitimacy of the 
Treaty of New Echota for over a century.60 The Court expressly recognized the 
Treaty of New Echota’s authority a few decades after its creation when Justice 
Harlan stated the following in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.61: 
By the treaty of New Echota, 1835, the United States covenanted and 
agreed that the lands ceded to the Cherokee Nation should at no future 
time, without their consent, be included within the territorial limits or 
jurisdiction of any State or Territory, and that the government would 
secure to that nation ‘the right by their national councils to make and 
carry into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for the 
government of the persons and property within their own country, 
belonging to their people, or such persons as have connected themselves 
with them’ . . . .62 
Since Cherokee Nation, the federal judiciary has consistently ruled on 
Cherokee matters and has never questioned the United States’ ability to enforce 
 
 56. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 519. 
 57. 93 U.S. 188 (1876). 
 58. Id. at 196. 
 59. See Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 478–79, 486, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, 
at 439–40, 447; Rosser, supra note 2, at 107.  
 60. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 620 (1970); In re E. Cherokees, 220 
U.S. 83, 84–85 (1911); United States v. Cherokee Nation, 202 U.S. 101, 128 (1906); Stephens v. 
Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 484–86 (1899); E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 117 
U.S. 288, 310 (1886); E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, 632 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Boyd, 83 F. 547, 553 (4th Cir. 1897); Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 782 F.2d 
871, 874–75 (10th Cir. 1986); Cherokee Nation v. Nash, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86, 92–94 (D.D.C. 2017); 
Cherokee Nation of Indians in Okla. ex rel. W. Cherokee Indians v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 532, 
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references it as legitimate. 
 61. 135 U.S. 641 (1890).  
 62. Id. at 654. 
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the provisions of the Treaty of New Echota. To the best of my knowledge, there 
is not a single case where a federal court has questioned the United States’ claim 
to the lands taken from the Cherokee by the Treaty of New Echota, and modern 
courts continue to enforce the Treaty of New Echota as binding. Most recently, 
in the 1970 case of Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,63 the Court reaffirmed the 
Treaty of New Echota’s binding legal authority.64 The 4–3 decision to grant the 
Cherokee property rights to the river bed of the lower Arkansas River was 
reached by recognizing the Treaty of New Echota as authoritative on the 
question of what property rights were afforded to the Tribe and determining 
that “the United States intended to and did convey title [to the river bed]” 
through the Treaty of New Echota.65 
Because the federal judiciary has uniformly enforced the rights guaranteed 
by the Treaty of New Echota and it satisfies the technical treaty requirements 
in the U.S. Constitution, there is little question as to the Treaty of New 
Echota’s status as a valid and official treaty between the United States and the 
Cherokee. Thus, the Treaty of New Echota’s terms were fully binding on its 
parties in the nineteenth century and remain binding in the twenty-first 
century. 
IV.  DOES THE TREATY GUARANTEE THE CHEROKEE A RIGHT TO A 
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATE? 
So, the Treaty of New Echota and its terms are legally binding on the 
United States, but do those terms guarantee the Cherokee a right to a delegate 
in the U.S. House of Representatives? Answering this question requires 
interpreting the delegate clause. The following sections introduce the tools that 
the federal judiciary has used to interpret treaties with Native Americans for 
centuries—the canons of construction—and then apply the canons to the Treaty 
of New Echota to determine whether the Cherokee have an affirmative right to 
a delegate in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
A. The Indian Law Canons of Construction 
The canons of construction are the primary legal method for interpreting 
Native American treaty language. 66 For nearly two centuries, the Supreme 
Court has applied these canons of construction to treaties in which a Native 
American tribe is a party to interpret the treaties’ terms and determine their 
legal effects. 67  From this jurisprudence, legal practitioners, scholars, and 
 
 63. 397 U.S. 620 (1979). 
 64. Id. at 620. 
 65. Id. at 635. 
 66. See COHEN, supra note 12, at 221–22. 
 67. Scott C. Hall, The Indian Law Canons of Construction v. The Chevron Doctrine: Congressional 
Intent and the Unambiguous Answer to the Ambiguous Problem, 37 CONN. L. REV. 495, 496 (2004) (citing 
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members of the judiciary have recognized and accepted four rules to use when 
interpreting Native American treaties: (1) treaties are to be construed as the 
Native Americans would have understood them; (2) treaties should be liberally 
construed in favor of Native Americans; (3) ambiguities in a treaty should be 
resolved in favor of Native Americans; and (4) Native American rights and 
sovereignty granted under a treaty are retained unless subsequent congressional 
intent to diminish them is clear.68 Each of these rules is a canon in its own right, 
and together, they form the canons of construction. The proceeding sections 
explain each of the canons in greater detail. 
1. The First Canon 
The early formulations of the first canon of construction—that treaties 
should be read as the Native Americans would have understood them—arose 
from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Worcester.69 In this opinion, he stated 
that a term about hunting grounds in the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell70 should “be 
taken in the sense in which it was most obviously used” because the Cherokee 
“were not critical judges of our language . . . [and] might not understand the 
term employed . . . .”71 Chief Justice Marshall’s rationale for this decision is 
evidence that this canon arose to ensure fairness and equity for Native American 
tribes in their dealings with the United States.72 These agreements between 
Native Americans and the United States were often formed with an underlying 
imbalance of power because the Native Americans were not masters of technical 
treaty language.73 Subsequent courts quickly supported Chief Justice Marshall’s 
decision and reasoning.74 Decades after the Worcester decision, the Supreme 
Court used the first canon again in Kennedy v. Becker 75 to construe another 
treaty’s clause concerning hunting rights—this time interpreting a treaty with 
the Seneca Nation.76 The Supreme Court construed this clause as the Native 
Americans would have understood it: a shared privilege with the federal 
government and others to whom the federal government chose to grant hunting 
rights.77 This canon has been developed in the centuries following Worcester, 
 
COHEN, supra note 12, at 222 n.42); see, e.g., Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 631 (1970); Alaska Pac. 
Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552–53 
(1832). 
 68. Hall, supra note 67, at 495 (citing COHEN, supra note 12, at 222). 
 69. Worcester, 31 U.S (6 Pet.) at 552–53. 
 70. Treaty of Hopewell, supra note 18, at 19, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 8–11. 
 71. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 552–53. 
 72. See COHEN, supra note 12, at 222.  
 73. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 552–53. 
 74. See COHEN, supra note 12, at 222. 
 75. 241 U.S. 556 (1916). 
 76. Id. at 557. 
 77. Id. at 563–64. 
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and the modern Court uses it whenever a question of Native American treaty 
interpretation arises.78 
2. The Second and Third Canons 
The second and third canons can be combined as a cohesive rule that 
requires liberal interpretation of treaties and their ambiguities in favor of Native 
Americans.79 This rule also originated in the Worcester opinion in which Chief 
Justice Marshall “read the treaties protecting the Cherokees from Georgia’s 
encroachment liberally” to the benefit of the Native Americans.80 Additionally, 
in his concurrence, Justice McLean simply stated that “[t]he language used in 
treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice.”81 Justice 
Davis subsequently reiterated Chief Justice Marshall’s yet-to-be-formalized 
second and third canons in The Kansas Indians. 82  Justice Davis interpreted 
certain ambiguous treaty terms concerning the taxation of the Miami Indian 
Tribe in the Tribe’s favor and cited the Worcester opinion as his rationale for 
doing so.83 Like the first canon, the second and third canons have been accepted 
by subsequent Courts and have become a bedrock principle for interpreting 
treaties to which Native Americans are a party. A modern example of this 
combination of canons comes from the 1985 case of County of Oneida v. Oneida 
Indian Nation of New York State.84 Justice Powell’s majority opinion states that 
“it is well established that treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the 
Indians . . . [and] ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.”85 The 
Court used this principle as a lens to view the terms of treaties in the Oneida 
Tribe’s favor, holding that the Oneida Tribe was entitled to damages for tribal 
land that New York occupied.86 
3. The Fourth Canon 
We now come to the most controversial canon. Unlike the first three 
canons of construction, which are usually beneficial to Native American treaty 
parties, the fourth canon is often quite detrimental to Native Americans. This 
canon dictates that rights guaranteed to Native Americans under a treaty are 
valid and enforceable only if Congress has not clearly expressed intent to strip 
 
 78. See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 
675–76 (1979). 
 79. See COHEN, supra note 12, at 222. 
 80. Hall, supra note 67, at 505. 
 81. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 (6 Pet.) U.S. 515, 582 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring). 
 82. 72 U.S. 737 (1866). 
 83. Id. at 760–61. 
 84. 470 U.S. 226 (1985). 
 85. Id. at 247. 
 86. Id. at 230, 247–48.  
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these rights away.87 If congressional intent to extinguish the rights included in 
treaties is “plain and unambiguous,” 88 then the judiciary must defer to the 
congressional assertion and hold that the rights are no longer guaranteed, and 
the relevant treaty provisions are no longer in effect.89 Think of this rule as a 
renege power. The United States, having made a fully valid and binding legal 
agreement with a Native American tribe, can relinquish its own contractual 
responsibilities and take away rights from the tribe, so long as Congress plainly 
and unambiguously expresses its intent to do so. 
The complexity of this rule arises in determining whether there has been 
a plain and unambiguous expression of congressional intent to renege on its 
contractual guarantees to a Native American tribe. The Court usually requires 
that congressional intent be expressed through legislation that directly 
contradicts a right previously guaranteed by a treaty. For example, in United 
States v. Dion, 90 the Supreme Court upheld a Native American defendant’s 
conviction for hunting bald eagles in violation of the Bald Eagle Protection Act 
of 1940,91 which outlawed the killing of bald eagles.92 The defendant argued that 
he had the right to hunt these animals under the 1858 Treaty with the Yankton 
Sioux,93 which granted the Native American Tribe broad hunting rights on the 
reservation where he was hunting at the time.94 However, the Court held that 
the Bald Eagle Protection Act, passed almost a century after the defendant’s 
tribe had been given the right to hunt these animals, subsequently abrogated 
the defendant’s right to hunt bald eagles, even on his own tribe’s reservation 
lands, because the legislation evidenced that Congress clearly expressed its 
intent to revoke the Yankton Sioux’s right to hunt bald eagles.95 
Cases revoking Native American treaty rights had traditionally been 
limited by the principle that congressional intent should not be “lightly 
implied”96 and instead must be clear, plain, and unambiguous. However, since 
the 1970s, the Supreme Court has become more willing to find congressional 
intent to abrogate Native American rights granted via treaty or otherwise.97 For 
example, in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,98 the Court 
 
 87. Hall, supra note 67, at 495 n.3, 521. 
 88. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346 (1946). 
 89. See COHEN, supra note 12, at 222; Hall, supra note 67, at 495 n.3. 
 90. 476 U.S. 734 (1986). 
 91. An Act for the Protection of the Bald Eagle, Pub. L. No. 76-567, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–668c).  
 92. Dion, 476 U.S. at 736, 740, 746.  
 93. Treaty with the Yankton Tribe of Sioux, U.S.-Yankton Sioux, Apr. 19, 1858, 11 Stat. 743, 
743–39, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 776–81. 
 94. Id. at 735, 737, 744–46.  
 95. Id. at 737–38, 744–46.  
 96. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1946). 
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99 N.C. L. REV. 223 (2020) 
2020] REPRESENTATION FOR REMOVAL? 237 
found that Congress’s intent in the Federal Power Act99 to allow the Federal 
Power Commission’s licensees to take needed land via eminent domain, 
including land belonging to Native Americans, was clear; thus, the Federal 
Power Commission’s licensees were permitted to diminish the Tuscarora 
Native American Tribe’s property rights to their reservation lands, even though 
the Federal Power Act did not explicitly mention the Tuscarora and only 
broadly mentioned the Federal Power Commission’s right to take land from 
citizens using eminent domain powers.100 There have been multiple cases since 
Tuscarora Indian Nation that similarly diminish the traditionally hefty burden 
of clear congressional intent.101 
However, regardless of the uptick in decisions consistent with Tuscarora 
Indian Nation, which make it easier for Congress to abrogate the treaty rights of 
Native Americans, the Court’s burden of finding clear congressional intent 
remains relatively weighty, as shown by Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians.102 In Mille Lacs, Minnesota argued that the Mille Lacs Band 
of Chippewa Native Americans lost their rights to hunt, fish, and gather on the 
land that was given to them by a federal treaty in 1837.103 The state cited an 
1850 executive order, an 1855 treaty, and the granting of Minnesota’s statehood 
in 1858 as evidence of congressional intent to diminish the Chippewa Tribe’s 
rights.104 The Court, however, roundly rejected all of these contentions, holding 
that each source cited was devoid of an express abrogation of usufructuary 
rights.105 
In totality, the canons of construction operate as a cohesive body of law 
that generally favor an expansive interpretation of treaties, so long as Congress 
has not expressed otherwise. Under these canons, if there is legitimate question 
as to whether a right granted by a treaty is more or less inclusive, the answer is 
always the former. These canons will not create rights that are not mentioned 
clearly in a treaty’s text, but if there is ambiguity as to the effect of the rights 
that are included in the treaty, the canons require that the resolution of the 
interpretation inquiry is pro-Native American. 
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B. Application of the Canons of Construction to the Treaty of New Echota 
Interpreting the delegate clause under the canons of construction 
demonstrates that the Cherokee have a legitimate entitlement to a delegate in 
the U.S. House of Representatives. 
1. The Canons Apply Because Textualism Is Inadequate 
For the canons of construction to apply, there must be an issue of 
interpretation—a conflict about the meaning of the terms in a treaty. 
Otherwise, the first three canons would be unnecessary. If the meaning of a 
treaty’s terms were clear, then there would be no need to read the treaty as the 
Native Americans would have understood it, no room for liberal construction, 
and no ambiguity to resolve. Under a textualist approach, historically the first 
step in the interpretation of any legal document, including treaties, the terms 
as written often adequately explain their meaning.106 However, the delegate 
clause cannot be adequately interpreted by a strictly linguistic reading, and thus, 
we must turn to the canons of construction for guidance. 
The relevant portion of Article 7 states that the Cherokee “shall be entitled 
to a delegate in the House of Representatives of the United States whenever 
Congress shall make provision for the same.”107  
The problem with a purely textual reading of the delegate clause is the use 
of the word “whenever.” This word creates too much ambiguity for a strictly 
textualist approach to be sufficient. In the first half of the delegate clause—
starting with “shall” and ending with “States”—there is an express mention of 
a delegate in the U.S. House of Representatives and an “entitle[ment] to [that] 
delegate . . . .”108 This lines up well with Principal Chief Hoskin’s claim that the 
Cherokee are entitled to a delegate. 109 So far, so good. However, the latter 
portion of the delegate clause—namely the word “whenever”—appears to place 
a contingency on the former. The use of “whenever” between these two phrases 
makes it unclear whether the Cherokee’s delegate entitlement has full legal 
authority as a congressional mandate or is merely permissive. Does the use of 
“whenever” mean that the Cherokee are entitled to a delegate only after 
affirmative congressional action? Or are they entitled to a delegate now but 
must wait for Congress to act? Is Congress even required to act at some point 
in the future? Maybe “whenever” means that the Cherokee are not truly entitled 
to a delegate at all because Congress can choose to act whenever it so desires, 
implying that Congress could thus never act? 
 
 106. See generally Andrew Tutt, Treaty Textualism, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 283 (2014) (explaining that 
the Framers and early Supreme Court “employ[ed] highly textual treaty interpretation not just as a 
matter of consensus, but as a matter of law”). 
 107. Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 482, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 441. 
 108. Id.  
 109. See Hoskin, supra note 7. 
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The crucial question is whether the delegate clause requires Congress to 
make a provision for a Cherokee delegate, and if so, when Congress must do 
so? Textualism cannot answer this question. The modifying word “whenever” 
can be reasonably understood as meaning (1) Congress is required to grant the 
Cherokee a delegate at some point soon after the Treaty of New Echota, (2) 
Congress must grant the delegate but can choose to delay its actions, or (3) 
Congress is not required to act at all but may do so on its own accord. The first 
and second options seem legitimate when considering that the drafters of the 
Treaty of New Echota chose the active words “whenever Congress shall make 
provision,” not passive words such as “if Congress decides to make provision” or 
“dependent on congressional approval.” The use of the Treaty of New Echota’s 
specific active language suggests that Congress must, at some point in time, 
affirmatively act to grant the Cherokee a delegate but can choose the time at 
which to act. However, the third option also seems plausible, given that the 
phrase could certainly mean the Cherokee only gain the right to the delegate at 
the point in time that Congress, of its own volition, makes a provision. From 
the linguistic construction of the sentence, it could be said that a delegate right 
is wholly contingent on legislative action, and if no action takes place, no right 
exists. Because of these conflicting interpretations, the meaning of the delegate 
clause is too unclear for a strictly textualist approach to provide a concrete 
answer. Therefore, we must use the canons of construction because, as Supreme 
Court precedent has dictated, they are the main judicial tools for interpreting 
Native American treaties. 
2. Application of the First Canon 
Analyzing the delegate clause under the first canon of construction 
suggests that the Cherokee would likely have understood the delegate clause to 
be a guaranteed right that was not meant to be delayed indefinitely by 
congressional inaction. 
Structurally, the delegate clause is included within the portion of the 
Treaty of New Echota that guarantees rights to the Cherokee people in return 
for their relinquishment of ancestral land.110 It is reasonable to assume that, 
because of the location of the delegate clause within the overall Treaty of New 
Echota, the Cherokee at the time of the Treaty of New Echota’s ratification 
(and the Cherokee involved in its creation and signing) would have understood 
the delegate clause to be a guaranteed right. 
Most convincing on this point is the fact that every other clause in the 
Treaty of New Echota that has been analyzed in the federal court system has 
been upheld as a guaranteed right. This includes clauses close in proximity and 
similar in construction to the delegate clause. 
 
 110. See supra Part II. 
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For example, Article 8, the clause directly after the delegate provision, 
discusses the United States’ obligation to support the Cherokee during the 
removal process.111 The Supreme Court inferentially recognized the legitimacy 
of Article 8 as a guaranteed right in the 1841 case of Minis v. United States112 
when it referenced the Treaty of New Echota as a valid legal basis for the 
plaintiff’s reimbursement claim.113 
Article 9 of the Treaty of New Echota, also close in proximity to Article 
7, in part guarantees that the United States will uphold its Article 8 promise to 
provide subsistence for the Cherokee during removal by doling out the 
appropriate amount of funds to the Cherokee “at the discretion of the President 
of the United States . . . .”114 The Cherokee’s right to the Article 8 funds was 
inferentially upheld as an unconditional right in Eastern Band of the Cherokee 
Indians v. United States,115 when the Court stated that the funds were “intended 
by the treaties with the United States, for the benefit of the united [Cherokee] 
Nation.”116 In Eastern Band, the Court determined that, while the Cherokee 
tribal members remaining in North Carolina were not individually entitled to 
any amount of the funds set aside by the federal government, these funds were 
undoubtedly property of the Cherokee Tribe as a whole.117 
Additionally, the stipulations in Article 9 are similar to the delegate clause 
in the sense that both are conditioned upon federal government action. Article 
7 requires that Congress make a provision for the Cherokee delegate, whereas 
Article 9 states that funds collected for their assistance will be dispersed to them 
at the President’s discretion. But again, in Eastern Band, the Court held that the 
Cherokee were entitled to these Article 8 funds,118 from which we can infer that 
the contingency of presidential discretion in Article 9 did nothing to alter the 
Cherokee’s unconditional entitlement to the funds. 
Article 5 guarantees that the lands granted to the Cherokee in the Treaty 
of New Echota shall remain Cherokee land for all “future time” and that the 
land should never be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any 
state.119 This particular promise is key to the Cherokee’s quasi-sovereign status. 
The authority of Article 5 was inferentially supported as unconditional in 
 
 111. See Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 482, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 443.  
 112. 40 U.S. 423 (1841). 
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Choctaw Nation when the Court recognized that Article 2 of the Treaty of New 
Echota granted the Cherokee rights to a riverbed in Oklahoma that even 
superseded claims to the property by the Oklahoma state government.120 The 
Court supported its Article 2 conclusion by quoting Article 5 in stating that, 
the United States accompanied its grants to petitioners with the promise 
that ‘no part of the land granted to them shall ever be embraced in any 
Territory or State.’ In light of this promise, it is only by the purest of 
legal fictions that there can be found even a semblance of an 
understanding (on which Oklahoma necessarily places its principal 
reliance), that the United States retained title in order to grant it to some 
future State.121 
Since these other clauses guarantee unconditional rights, there is little 
support for an alternative interpretation of the delegate clause when considering 
proximity and similarity. If the federal judiciary, comprised of experts in 
interpretation of English as well as legal language, has consistently upheld rights 
expressed in the Treaty of New Echota that are similar in style and close in 
proximity to the delegate provision as guaranteed rights, it is exceedingly 
plausible to argue that the Cherokee, who likely had a far more rudimentary 
understanding of the Treaty of New Echota’s technical language, would have 
understood the delegate clause as affirmatively granting an unconditional right 
to a delegate. 
Another important note is that the core provisions of the Treaty of New 
Echota—Articles 1 and 2—have always been respected as guaranteed rights and 
have no mentions of contingencies in their text. Article 2 has been consistently 
upheld by the judiciary as granting the Cherokee property rights to Oklahoma 
land122 and has not been interpreted as needing additional legislative action to 
become a fully-realized right.123 And there has never been any indication that 
Article 1, the provision detailing the Cherokee lands to be ceded to the United 
States, granted the United States only a conditional right to those lands. The 
federal government certainly did not think that their ownership of Georgia, 
Tennessee, Alabama, North Carolina, and South Carolina was conditional on 
further Cherokee action, and the federal government surely thinks the same 
today. So why would the Cherokee of the time, giving the United States 
unconditional control of their ancestral lands, think that the rights they received 
in exchange were conditioned on further actions of the United States? 
 
 120. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 620, 634–36 (1970); id. at 636–38 (Douglas, 
J., concurring).  
 121. Id. at 635 (majority opinion). 
 122. See, e.g., id. at 634–38.  
 123. See id.  
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Lastly, Article 3 of the Treaty of New Echota states that the Cherokee’s 
new land in Oklahoma “shall all be included in one patent executed to the 
Cherokee nation of Indians by the President of the United States . . . .” 124 
Though there is no language expressly requiring when the President was to issue 
the patent, similar to how there is no language setting a timeline for Congress 
to “make [a] provision” for the Cherokee delegate, the patent was promptly 
executed by President Van Buren in 1838—soon after the execution of the 
Treaty of New Echota.125 This furthers the idea that the considerations in the 
Treaty of New Echota were understood at the time not only as guaranteed 
rights but also as rights to be carried out by their respective parties in a diligent 
fashion, not left untouched for centuries. 
3. Application of the Second and Third Canons 
When applying the second and third canons of construction, it is also 
evident that the Cherokee have a right to a delegate in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. These canons dictate that, if there is ambiguity in the text of 
a treaty, it should be resolved by a liberal interpretation in favor of the Native 
Americans.126 
There is certainly ambiguity in the delegate clause. 127  Much of this 
argument has already been discussed in Section IV.B.1, but it is important to 
reiterate here for purposes of analysis under the canons. The most obvious 
ambiguity is the confusion created by the word “whenever.” 
The phrase “whenever Congress shall make provision for the same” could 
be read as suggesting that the entitlement to a delegate in the U.S. House of 
Representatives is contingent upon Congress making such a provision. The 
Treaty of New Echota does not say “[when] Congress shall make provision for 
the same,” but rather uses the word “whenever,” possibly implying that 
Congress can make the provision at any time without care for timeliness or 
obligation to act. Then again, a different interpretation could be that the use of 
“whenever” is simply to solidify that no matter how long it takes Congress to 
make a delegate provision, the Cherokee are entitled to that delegate, and 
Congress is required to act accordingly at some point, whether now or in the 
future. Both interpretations seem entirely plausible, especially when 
considering the conflicting active and passive word choices that the drafters of 
the Treaty of New Echota used in “whatever” and “shall.” Because of this 
linguistic conflict, the effect of the delegate clause is quite ambiguous. 
 
 124. Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 480, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 441–42. 
 125. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 630. 
 126. See supra Section IV.A.2. 
 127. See supra Section IV.B.1. 
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Moreover, the notion that a clause providing for a nonguaranteed right to 
a delegate would be included in the Treaty of New Echota is nonsensical. Why 
would the delegate clause be placed in the Treaty of New Echota at all if the 
only way the Cherokee could get a delegate would be to simply wait for 
Congress to unilaterally create that delegate on its own time? If that were the 
case, the delegate clause is simply a redundant and unnecessary statement of 
congressional power to grant the Cherokee a delegate if it ever so desired. It 
would be nonsensical for the drafters to waste time and effort to include the 
delegate clause if it was a redundant expression of a nonguaranteed possibility, 
especially considering that, in an official treaty of the United States, every word 
is important, consequential, and has an operative effect.128 
Structure also plays an important role in the ambiguity argument. As 
previously discussed, the location and language suggest that the delegate clause 
is a guaranteed right. 129  So, why would this particular clause provide a 
conditional right when all the surrounding clauses grant the Cherokee 
unconditional rights? At the very least, it is plausible to say that, considering 
courts have held many other rights in the Treaty of New Echota to be 
unconditional, it is unclear whether the delegate provision is conditional. The 
fact that this Recent Development and several other articles130 all dive into the 
linguistic nuances and meaning of the delegate clause almost two hundred years 
after the Treaty of New Echota was drafted and ratified suggests there is 
ambiguity. If the issue is a topic of debate after nearly two centuries, that seems 
indicative of uncertainty. 
The second and third canons require that a court interpret the ambiguity 
in favor of the Cherokee. This combination of canons leans heavily toward a 
pro-Cherokee interpretation of the delegate clause. Seeing as there is 
considerable confusion as to the operation of the words “whenever Congress 
shall make provision for the same,” precedent suggests that a federal court 
would likely find the right to a delegate under Article 7 was not meant to be 
stifled by congressional inaction for centuries. This would resolve the existing 
ambiguity in favor of the Cherokee by holding the United States accountable 
for the promise it made and which the Cherokee likely understood to be 
unconditional. 
 
 128. Charlie D. Stewart, The Rhetorical Canons of Construction: New Textualism’s Rhetoric Problem, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1487 n.9 (2018); Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends, 
EVERYCRSREPORT.COM (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45153.html 
[https://perma.cc/4MVV-BPU9] (“Courts should ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of 
a statute’ so that ‘no clause is rendered “superfluous, void, or insignificant.”’”). For application of the 
rule against surplusage to a treaty, see, for example, Tutt, supra note 106, at 350. 
 129. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
 130. See generally Blair, supra note 3 (arguing that that the canons of construction establish the 
intent of the United States to create a Cherokee delegate through the delegate clause); Rosser, supra 
note 2 (explaining the many historical interpretations of the delegate clause). 
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4. Application of the Fourth Canon 
The fourth canon of construction, while important, lacks substantial 
application here. This canon states that rights provided by a treaty are retained 
absent any unambiguous expression to the contrary. However, there is no 
indication that Congress has clearly expressed an intent to abrogate the rights 
included in the Treaty of New Echota. There has been no federal legislative act, 
law, or codification that extinguishes the Treaty of New Echota or challenges 
its legality. Additionally, federal courts have consistently referenced the Treaty 
of New Echota as the controlling source of the current legal relationship 
between the United States and the Cherokee. 131  Moreover, it is clear that 
Oklahoma’s statehood cannot be viewed as extinguishing the Cherokee’s rights 
under the Treaty of New Echota (without some clear expression of that 
intent)132 because the rights of state governments do not generally supersede 
the rights contained in treaties between the federal government and Native 
Americans unless irreconcilable.133  
Not only do the aforementioned facts show there has been no express 
abrogation of the Treaty of New Echota but one could also argue that, because 
no superseding legislation has been passed after nearly two centuries, Congress 
actually intends the Treaty of New Echota’s provisions to control. Congress has 
had ample time to abrogate the delegate clause but has not done so. The United 
States’ reliance on the Treaty of New Echota as the basis for its ownership of 
the Cherokee’s ancestral lands furthers the argument that if Congress intended 
to abrogate the Treaty of New Echota, it would already have done so. Since 
there is no evidence that Congress has abrogated or intends to abrogate the 
Treaty of New Echota, the delegate clause is not affected by the fourth canon 
of construction. 
CONCLUSION 
When analyzed through the lens of the canons of construction, the 
delegate clause grants the Cherokee a right to a delegate in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. While the full realization of this right requires a least some 
congressional action—to draft and pass a “provision for the same”134—Congress 
should be diligent in its fulfillment of the promise the United States made to 
the Cherokee nearly two centuries ago. The affirmative right to a delegate, 
which the Treaty of New Echota grants to the Cherokee, requires more than 
the glaring lack of legislative action it has received. Because the canons of 
construction clearly suggest that the Cherokee are guaranteed a delegate in the 
 
 131. See supra Part III. 
 132. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202–03 (1999).  
 133. See id. at 202–05.  
 134. Treaty of New Echota, supra note 6, at 482, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 6, at 441. 
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U.S. House of Representatives, the canons support the timely adoption and 
execution of this right, despite Congress’s inexcusable inaction on the matter 
since 1835. 
The United States has received the full benefit of the contract it made 
with the Cherokee, gaining title to the Cherokee’s ancestral lands and a legal 
basis to forcibly expel Native Americans from their home in one of the greatest 
atrocities the United States has ever committed.135 But the Cherokee have not 
received the full benefit of that contract. They are still being denied their rights 
guaranteed to them by the United States. It is high time that the Cherokee are 
given the full legal consideration to which they are entitled pursuant to the 
Treaty of New Echota that authorized their dispersion and desolation. 
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